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Abstract
In fiscally decentralized countries, sub-national governments (SNGs) may face soft
budget constraints and consequently invest and borrow too much. The policy litera-
ture claims that, with competitive capital markets and central governments imposing
hard budget constraints (HBCs), ineﬃcient investment by SNGs should not arise. We
present a model where this is not the case: HBCs can be too "hard" and discour-
age investment that is socially eﬃcient. The model combines a dynamic commitment
problem as in Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2004) for central government with a moral
hazard problem between central and SNG. The HBC over-incentivises the SNG to pro-
vide eﬀort by penalizing it too much for project failure, thus leading ultimately to the
possibility that socially eﬃcient projects may not be undertaken.
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1 Introduction
Fiscal decentralization, the allocation of tax and spending powers to lower levels of govern-
ment, is now an established policy objective, in many developed and developing countries.
Moreover, it is actively promoted as a development strategy by organizations such as the
World Bank (Azfar et al. (2001), World Bank (2000)). The usual advantages that are
claimed for decentralization that one can find in the literature include the following (Az-
far et al. (2001), Oates (1999)). First, decentralization is claimed to improve allocative
eﬃciency, in the sense that the goods provided by governments in localities will be better
matched to the preferences of the residents of those localities. Second, decentralization is
argued to increase the accountability of government. There is now a growing theoretical and
empirical literature1 evaluating these claims.
However, it is increasingly claimed that one of the costs of fiscal decentralization is that
central government may lose control over aggregate government borrowing. In particular,
it is thought that if subnational governments (henceforth regional governments, RGs) face
soft budget constraints2, they will have an incentive to over-borrow, and/or pay insuﬃcient
attention to the quality of the investments that their borrowing finances. For example, Ter-
Minassian, Albino-War, and Singh (2004) say; "Over the last two decades, the deepening
of the decentralization process has resulted in many countries in a significant increase in
subnational public expenditure and debt."
The "common pool" mechanism by which over-borrowing can occur has also been ex-
plored quite thoroughly in the academic literature (for example, Wildasin (1997) and Good-
speed (2002)). The commitment of central government (CG) to bail out RGs who cannot
pay creates a negative externality if - as is usual - the cost of bailout is met through increases
in taxes or reductions in spending nationally: other regions will partially finance one region’s
bailout. In turn, this induces excessive borrowing initially.
However, in both the existing academic and policy literature, it is universally assumed
that because of this externality, a hard budget constraint (HBC) for RG is always desirable.
Indeed, much of the literature is concerned with the design of institutional mechanisms
that will harden the budget constraint (Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack (2003)). It is the
purpose of this paper to take issue with this presupposition; we would argue that in some
circumstances, a HBC is too "hard".
1The theoretical literature evaluating the preference-matching argument includes Alesina and Spolaore
(1997), Besley and Coate (2003), Ellingsen (1998), Lockwood (2002), Oates (1972), and Wallis and
Oates (1988), while empirical contributions are fewer, but include Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2002) and
Faguet(2004).
Theoretical analysis of the accountability argument includes Seabright (1996) and Bardhan and Mookher-
jee (1998, 2000). Emprical contributions include Fisman and Gatti (2000), Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky
(2004), Hutter and Shah (1998), Melo and Barenstein (2001), and Treisman (2002).
2Probably the best general definition of a soft budget constraint (SBC) is that of the survey by Kornai,
Maskin and Roland (2004) in the Journal of Economic Literature: "A budget-constrained organization faces
a hard budget constraint (HBC) as long as it does not receive support from other organizations to cover its
deficit and is obliged to reduce or cease its activity if the deficit persists. The SBC phenomenon occurs if
one or more supporting organizations are ready to cover all or part of the deficit."
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Our argument is the following. First, by definition3, a HBC necessarily implies that "bad"
investment projects will be terminated, when ex post, it would be desirable to continue them
though additional financing. Now suppose that by exerting some eﬀort, RGs can lower the
probability that projects are "bad". Then, with a HBC, RGs are over-incentivised to provide
eﬀort, as the payoﬀ to the RG in the event of a bad project is excessively low. Thus, eﬀort
exerted may be ineﬃcient. More importantly, when this is the case, some projects will not
be initiated in the first place, even when it is eﬃcient to do so. So, a HBC may lead to
underinvestment.
In more detail, in our model, RGs have the option of choosing to initiate a discrete project
or not. The initial cost of the project is covered by the financial resources of the RG e.g.
tax revenue. The project may be good or bad. The probability that the project is bad is
determined by eﬀort expended by regional government, once the initial investment in the
project is made. Eﬀort may be high, in which case the project is always good, or low, in
which case the project is bad with a positive probability.
If it is good, it immediately generates a non-monetary benefit for the region greater than
the cost. If it is bad, it generates no benefit unless additional resources are invested. If these
resources are invested, the project pays a non-monetary benefit to the region greater than
the additional resource cost, but less than the total resource cost. Thus, there is a dynamic
commitment problem. The eﬀort of RG, and the resulting type of project in any region
(good or bad) may be observable by central government (or CG), but is not verifiable, in
the sense that central government cannot condition any incentive scheme for RG on these
variables.
Our precise definition of HBC and SBC in this setting is as follows. It is assumed that
at the point at which a bad project needs to be refinanced, neither regional nor central
government have any tax revenues available, but the RG can borrow from a competitive
banking sector. When the loan is due for repayment, only central government has the fiscal
capacity to make the repayment, by levying a national income tax. A SBC is in place when
(i) CG allows the RG to borrow and (ii) it is willing to repay any loans by levying an income
tax. A HBC is in place4 when either (i) CG forbids the RG to borrow (rules-based HBC) or
(ii) the CG precommits not to repay any loans incurred by RG (market discipline HBC).
In this setting, with a SBC, local governments have insuﬃcient incentives to put in high
eﬀort (eﬀort too low) for project implementation, and also may initiate projects when it is
ineﬃcient to do so ("too many" projects), because the cost of refinancing a bad project is
shared with other regions though the tax system. This point is well-understood and has
3As stressed by Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2004), a dynamic commitment problem (where ex ante, bad
projects are undesirable, but ex post, it is eﬃcient to refinance them) is a necessary condition for a SBC to
be ineﬃcient, and thus for there to be a SBC problem in the first place.
4This follows Ter-Minassian (1997), who makes the distinction between a rules-based andmarket discipline
HBCs. The first is the imposition of rules on borrowing, ranging from an outright ban on borrowing by RG,
to weaker restrictions, such as borrowing only to fund investment, or imposing a maximum debt-service to
income ratio. The second involves giving RGs free access to capital markets, along with precommitment by
central government not to repay any loans incurred by RGs that RGs are unable or unwilling to repay (see
also Lane (1993)).
3
been argued formally e.g. by Wildasin (1997).
Our new point, as mentioned above, is that with a HBC, local governments have ex-
cessively strong incentives to put in high eﬀort (eﬀort too high), and also may not initiate
projects when it is eﬃcient to do so ("too few" projects). The reason is the following. Once
a project turns out to be bad, it is ex post eﬃcient to complete it. But, with a HBC, the
bad project is terminated. Thus, with a HBC, the net benefit to a region from a bad project
is ineﬃciently low. Thus, the RG government has too high an incentive to put in high eﬀort.
In turn, this implies that a project may give the RG a negative payoﬀ (taking into account
the cost of eﬀort) even when its true social benefit is positive. This key point is made via a
numerical example in the next section.
Related literature is discussed more fully below, but here it is worth pointing out that our
results are related to, but also distinct from, the literature on rules vs. discretion5. In that
literature, a policy variable can be set by government either ex ante i.e. before the realisation
of some stochastic shock or ex post. An ex ante setting (a policy rule) has the disadvantage
that it cannot be conditioned on the shock (lack of flexibility) but the advantage that it
prevents a sub-optimal response by either the private sector or a lower level of government
(precommitment). In our model, a HBC (SBC) could be interpreted as a rule (discretion).
It is certainly true that a HBC is inflexible, as it prevents an ex post optimal response in the
event of a bad shock i.e. if the project turns out to be bad. But, the HBC does not induce
an eﬃcient response by RG - eﬀort will generally be too high.
The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 has a numerical example.
Then, Section 3 presents the model and the eﬃcient benchmark. Section 4 contains the main
results, Section 5 considers full centralization and decentralization as solutions, and Section
6 concludes.
2 An Example
The key point of this paper can be illustrated by a simple example. We deliberately keep the
example general so as to emphasize that our point has applications outside fiscal federalism.
Consider an "agent" (here, the RG) who can choose an initial binary investment in a project
at cost 1. The agent then can choose a low eﬀort level (normalized to zero) or a high eﬀort
level (normalized to 1). The cost of low eﬀort is zero to the agent, whereas the cost of high
eﬀort is 0.8. If eﬀort is high, the project immediately realises a benefit of 2 with probability
1. If eﬀort is low, the project realises a benefit (for the agent) of 2 with probability 0.5, and
no benefit with probability 0.5. However, in this event (i.e. if the project turns out to be
"bad") if an additional investment of 1 is made, a benefit of 1.5 for the agent is then realized.
The principal (here, the central government) only has the role of deciding whether to
allow an additional investment to be made. If he does (does not) we say that there is a soft
(hard) budget constraint. Finally, for consistency with the more general model that follows,
5A paper on fiscal federalism that fits much more into the rules vs. discretion framework is Sanguinetti
and Tommasi (2004). See Section 6 below.
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we suppose that the cost of the additional investment is shared equally between the principal
and agent.
Consider first what the eﬃcient investment and eﬀort, and refinancing decision is. First,
if eﬀort is high, the payoﬀ is 2. If eﬀort is low and the project turns out to be bad, refinancing
is ex post eﬃcient, in which case the expected payoﬀ is 0.5× 2 + 0.5× (1.5− 1) = 1.25. So,
the gain to high eﬀort over low is 0.75, which is less than the cost of eﬀort. So, low eﬀort
is eﬃcient. Given that low eﬀort is eﬃcient, the ex ante payoﬀ to the project (when the
decision about initial investment is made) is 1.25, greater than the initial cost. So, initial
investment in the project is eﬃcient.
Now consider the outcome with a hard budget constraint. First, if eﬀort is high, the
payoﬀ is 2. If eﬀort is low and the project turns out to be bad, refinancing is impossible, in
which case the expected payoﬀ is 0.5×2+0.5×0 = 1. So, the gain to high eﬀort over low is 1,
which is greater than the cost of eﬀort. So, high eﬀort will be chosen. Given this, the ex ante
payoﬀ to the project (when the decision about initial investment is made) is 2− 0.8 = 1.2,
greater than the initial cost. So, initial investment in the project will occur. So, we see that
a hard budget constraint induces an eﬀort distortion (too much eﬀort) because the payoﬀ to
the "bad" project is "too low". This is because the HBC does not allow continuation of the
bad project, replacing a payoﬀ of 0.5 with one of 0.
There is also another possible consequence of the HBC. Suppose now the initial cost of
the project increases from 1 to 1.23. Then, it is still eﬃcient to undertake the project, but
in equilibrium with the HBC, the project will not be initiated, as the expected payoﬀ from
doing so is 1.2 < 1.23. So, the ineﬃciency generated by the HBC may be in the form of
excessive eﬀort or underfunding of projects.
Note here that there is nothing unusual or pathological about our definition of the HBC
- it is exactly6 as in Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2004). Note however, that although our
definition of the HBC is eﬀectively identical to that of Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2004),
our findings about the economic consequences about the HBC are rather diﬀerent. At the
heart of their model (which encompasses a number of special cases already in the literature),
there is a problem of hidden information; the agent has the authority to choose projects,
and he knows which are good and which are bad, whereas the principal does not. In that
setting, a HBC always restores eﬃciency, as it deters the agent from choosing a bad project.
By contrast, in our model, there is a problem of hidden action: the principal would like
to incentivise the regional government to put in high (or low) eﬀort in certain situations (see
Proposition 1 below), but cannot oﬀer an explicit incentive contract to achieve this. The
choice of HBC or SBC is too blunt an instrument to correctly incentivise the agent.
Of course, if the principal could make explicit payments to the agent conditional on
the project outcome, as in the classical principal-agent literature, then eﬃciency could be
restored. For example, if the principal could combine the SBC with a penalty if the project
turned out to be bad, then the penalty can be set so that eﬀort will be eﬃcient: this is
discussed in more detail below. But if payments conditional on project outcomes are possible,
6Here, the budget-constrained organization is regional government, and the supporting organization is
central government.
5
then the distinction between hard and soft budget constraints disappears. Moreover, these
payments are not observed in practice between CG and RGs.
3 The Model
3.1 Preliminaries
The model has three periods t = 0, 1, 2 and two regions, i = a, b. Each region has a continuum
of residents of measure 1. In the last period, each resident derives utility from consumption
of a numeraire good, which is produced in either region from labor input by competitive
firms using a constant-returns technology, where units are chosen so that one unit of labor
produces one unit of output. So, the wage is fixed at unity. Each resident is endowed with
one unit of labor which it can supply to firms in that region. Residents may also benefit from
public projects provided by the regional government. There are two levels of government,
central (CG) and regional (RG). There is no discounting of future payoﬀs.
3.2 The Order of Events
The order of events, and relevant features of the model in more detail, are as follows.
t = 0
1. The central government decides whether to set a SBC or a HBC. A SBC is in place
when (i) CG allows the RG to borrow and (ii) it is willing to repay any loans by levying an
income tax. A HBC is in place when either (i) CG forbids the RG to borrow (rules-based
HBC) or (ii) the CG precommits not to repay any loans incurred by RG (market discipline
HBC).
t = 1
1. The regional government of i chooses whether or not to finance a project in its region,
by making an investment of c of the numeraire good. Without any real loss of generality,
we assume that regional government of i has an initial endowment of only c, so that any
additional investment will need to be externally financed.
2. If the project is initiated, the regional government exerts eﬀort ei ∈ {0,∆} on its
implementation. If region i exerts eﬀort ei = ∆, the project will be good. If ei = 0, the
project is good with probability p and bad with probability 1− p.
t = 2
1. The project type (good or bad) in region i is revealed to the regional government of
i and the central government. If the project in region i is good, it generates a non-financial
benefit for all the residents of region i of bg. If the project is bad, it generates no benefit at
this date, but requires an additional input of c in order to be completed.
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2. If a SBC has been set, finance is provided7 by a competitive banking sector, comprising
profit-maximising, risk-neutral banks, with free entry into the sector. A bank k ∈ N =
{1, 2, ..n} oﬀers a loan c to finance the project continuation and demands repayment rki .
Then, competition among banks, plus no discounting, will ensure that rki = c. The regional
government either borrows to finance continuation, or chooses not to continue with the
project. If the project is terminated, the payoﬀ to the project is zero. If continued, the bad
project pays a non-financial benefit for all the residents of region i of bb.
If a HBC has been set, the project is terminated.
3. If a SBC has been set, the central government sets an income tax at rate τ to finance
the total repayment r of the loans taken out by the regional governments, if any. Following
an extensive literature, the central government is assumed to set a uniform tax rate in both
regions i.e. τ = τa = τ b. As the total tax base is simply the aggregate pre-tax wage bill of
2, the budget constraint of the central government is 2τ = r.
The timing and structure of the model are depicted in Figure 1.
∆=e
0=e
gb
τ−bb
0Termination
Initial
investment
Refinancing
p
p−1
gb
Bailout
No 
Bailout
0
0=t 1=t 2=t
Choice of
budget constraint
regime
Figure 1: Timing and structure of the model
For the rest of the paper, we concentrate our attention on projects satisfying
0 <
bb
2
< c < bb < bg
These inequalities imply that the projects we deal with are such that the central government
faces a dynamic commitment problem if no eﬀort is made: that is, a bad project is ineﬃcient
7Note that with a market discipline HBC, the RGs are free to borrow from the banking sector, but the
banks are unwilling to lend, as the rationally anticipate not being repaid.
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ex ante, but one initiated, it is ex post eﬃcient to refinance it. Moreover, the project yields
higher benefits if it is done with eﬀort than if it is undertaken with no eﬀort and refinanced.
We can interpret this lower benefit as the consequence of the delay in finishing the project.
We also assume that projects are identical between regions. By identical projects we mean:
same cost c, same values of benefits (bb, bg), same cost of eﬀort and same probability of
having a bad project after no eﬀort.
Throughout, we assume that governments are benevolent i.e. both regional and central
governments maximize the sum or average of the welfares of the residents of their jurisdic-
tions, minus the cost of eﬀort (if any). For simplicity, we take the cost of eﬀort e to be e
itself.
3.3 Discussion
There are four decisions that either level of government must make in this model: whether
to finance the project at the beginning of t = 1, the eﬀort to be expended on project
implementation, whether to continue the project (given the menu of loans on oﬀer from the
banks) and the setting of the taxes at the end of t = 2.
In the model exposited above, we have assumed that regional governments make initial
investment decisions and project implementation and central government authorizes the
continuation borrowing and makes the tax decision. This describes the situation in many
countries very well. For example, in a detailed survey of fifteen countries, Ter-Minassian,
Albino-War, and Singh (2004) found that in seven of them, regional governments had (at
some time) been subject to centrally imposed fiscal rules on debt, borrowing, etc. So, it
is a widely observed practice for governments to constrain the borrowing of sub-central
government: this corresponds to our definition of the HBC. Also, in most of the remaining
countries, borrowing limits of sub-national government have been cooperatively negotiated
with central government, and in many cases, enforced by market-based discipline. In our
model, ex post i.e. once the project is initiated, national and regional governments have
the same preferences vis-à-vis project continuation, so cooperative bargaining (more of less
however it is modelled) would lead to a decision to continue the project i.e. a SBC. We call
this scenario divided government and it will be the focus of our analysis. Other forms of
government are considered in Section 6 below.
3.4 The Eﬃcient Policy
Consider a social planner who can make all the decisions that are above divided between the
two levels of government i.e. (i) whether to undertake the project initially; (ii) the level of
eﬀort for project implementation in either region, and (iii) can decide whether to continue
the bad project after the first period or not. If continuation is chosen, it must be financed
by borrowing from a bank. We assume that the social planner has the same objective as
that of central government i.e. the sum of the welfares of the two regions, and moreover, the
social planner is assumed to face the same informational constraint as central government
and regional government i.e. he observes the project quality only after eﬀort is chosen.
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Solving the social planner’s decision problem backward, first, note that given that a bad
project cannot be identified until the project is funded and eﬀort is exerted, continuation is
always better, as bb > c. The net social benefit from a high level of eﬀort in either region
is therefore W ∗h = bg −∆. The net social benefit from no eﬀort depends on whether a bad
project is terminated or continued. So, as the project will be continued, the return from a
low level of eﬀort in either region is
W ∗l = pbg + (1− p)(bb − c)
Eﬀort is optimal if W ∗h ≥W ∗l which holds if
∆ ≤ (1− p)(bg + c− bb) = ∆∗
One can see that the threshold ∆∗ increases with the cost of refinancing a bad project.
When this cost c increases, it is eﬃcient to exert eﬀort even for higher levels of the cost of
eﬀort. The reason is that the social planner prefers to exert eﬀort in order to generate a
good project and thus to prevent the second round of financing.
Finally, we consider the decision whether to initiate the project.8 Note that when ∆ ≤
∆∗ : the social planner undertakes the project if ∆ ≤ bg − c, and when ∆ > ∆∗ : the social
planner undertakes the project if
c ≤ pbg + (1− p)bb
2− p = c
∗
To summarise:
Proposition 1. If ∆ ≤ min{∆∗, bg − c}, investment and high eﬀort are eﬃcient in both
regions. If ∆ > ∆∗ and c ≤ c∗ investment and low eﬀort are eﬃcient in both regions.
Otherwise, no investment in either region is eﬃcient.
The eﬃcient project choice, plus choice of eﬀort is depicted in the following figure.
c
bb
*∆
∆
2
bb
*c
∆=** e,P
*NP
0=** e,P
cbg −
Figure 2: Eﬃcient project and eﬀort choice
8Recall that the initial investment is paid with initial resources.
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Each point in this graph represents a project, characterized mainly by the values of ∆
and c. To draw this figure, we have assumed that pbg < bb.9 So c∗ ∈
¡ bb
2
, bb
¢
. The bold
line separates the parametric areas where projects are undertaken (denoted by P ∗ in the
figure) or not undertaken (denoted by NP ∗). On the one hand, when bg − c < ∆ < ∆∗ and
c ∈ [c∗, bb], projects are not undertaken (in spite of the fact that they will be good because
eﬀort should be made) because their net benefit is below the opportunity cost of keeping the
initial resources that can be used for private consumption. On the other hand, when ∆ > ∆∗
and c ∈ [c∗, bb], projects are not undertaken because the cost of two rounds of financing is
above their benefit.
4 Divided Government
In this section, we analyse the model when government is divided. At this stage, we are
taking the form of the budget constraint (hard or soft) as fixed. This generates two diﬀerent
games.
4.1 A Soft Budget Constraint
We solve the game backwards. We will initially assume that both regions initiate projects.
The final event is that central government sets a tax to finance total loan repayments, which
are r = (Ia + Ib)c, where Ii = 1 if the project in region i is bad and Ii = 0 otherwise.
Recalling that 2τ = r, we see that
τ =
c
2
[Ia + Ib] (1)
i.e. the resident of either region only pays half the cost of additional financing of a bad
project in his region, as this cost is shared though a national tax.
So, conditional on project realizations Ia, Ib, the utility of a resident of region i in equi-
librium is
ui = (1− Ii)bg + Iibb − τ (2)
=
(
bg − c2Ij if ei = ∆
(1− Ii)bg + Iibb − c2 [Ii + Ij] if ei = 0
where in the second line, we have used the formula for τ in (1) above, and also the fact that
Ii = 1 is impossible if ei = ∆. Note the fiscal externality generated by the aggregate budget
constraint: ui depends negatively on the possibility of a bad project in region j (Ij = 1), as
each region only bears a fraction (in this case half) of the cost of bailout.
We are now in a position to analyse equilibrium eﬀort choice by each region. Now, let
ui(ei, ej) be the expected present value of utility to a resident of region i from choice of eﬀort
9This assumption is only made for the sake of expositional purposes. Our main result does not depend
upon it.
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levels ei, ej ∈ {0,∆}. From (2), it follows immediately that:
ui(∆,∆) = bg (3)
ui(0,∆) = pbg + (1− p)(bb −
c
2
) (4)
ui(∆, 0) = bg − (1− p)
c
2
(5)
ui(0, 0) = p2bg + p(1− p)(bg −
c
2
) + (1− p)p(bb −
c
2
) + (1− p)2(bb − c) (6)
These can be explained as follows. First (3) follows because if both regions choose high
eﬀort, both projects are good and each region gets total benefit bg and τ = 0. Second, (4)
follows because if region i puts in low eﬀort, but region j puts in high, it gets a good project
with probability p; otherwise, with a bad project, it gets non-pecuniary benefit bb, and from
(1), τ = c
2
. Third, (5) follows because if region i puts in high eﬀort, but region j puts in low
eﬀort, it gets a good project with probability 1, but with probability 1 − p the project in
region j is bad, in which case τ = c
2
. Fourth, (6) follows as the aforementioned possibilities
can all occur in this case, plus the possibility that both projects are bad, in which case each
region gets net benefit bb − c.
From these expressions, it is easily calculated that
ui(∆,∆)− ui(0,∆) = ui(∆, 0)− ui(0, 0) = (1− p)(bg − bb +
c
2
)
So, for either region, it is a dominant strategy to put in eﬀort in project implementation, if
∆ ≤ (1− p)(bg − bb +
c
2
) = ∆SBC
and no eﬀort otherwise, conditional on the project having been initiated.
Now we turn to the project initiation decision. Denote by di ∈ {0, 1} the decision adopted
by the regional government of region i, where 1(0) means investment (no investment). Let
vi(di, dj) be the expected present value of utility to a resident of region i from choice of
investment di, dj ∈ {0, 1}.
When ∆ ≤ ∆SBC , the government of region i anticipates that both regions will exert
eﬀort if projects are initiated. So
vi(1, 1) = vi(1, 0) = bg −∆, vi(0, 1) = vi(0, 0) = c (7)
These can be easily explained because as both regions exert eﬀort if investment is made, no
bailout will be necessary and so there is no fiscal externality. Therefore, from (7), we have:
vi(1, 1)− vi(0, 1) = vi(1, 0)− vi(0, 0) = bg −∆− c
So, for either region is a dominant strategy to invest if ∆ ≤ bg − c.
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Now suppose that ∆ > ∆SBC . Now, the government of region i anticipates that both
regions will exert low eﬀort if investment is made. So
vi(1, 1) = p2bg + p(1− p)(bg −
c
2
) + (1− p)p(bb −
c
2
) + (1− p)2(bb − c) (8)
vi(0, 1) = −(1− p)
c
2
+ c (9)
vi(1, 0) = pbg + (1− p)(bb −
c
2
) (10)
vi(0, 0) = c (11)
These can be explained as follows. First (8) follows because if both regions invest, they will
afterwards choose no eﬀort. So both projects can be either good (in which case no bailout
is needed) or bad (so a bailout is needed) ; therefore all possibilities may occur. Second, (9)
follows because if region i does not invest but region j does, region i will bear the cost of a
bailout in j with probability (1 − p). Third, (10) follows because if region i invests, it gets
a good project with probability p, but with probability (1− p) the project is bad, in which
case a bailout will be needed. Fourth, (11) follows immediately. Therefore
vi(1, 1)− vi(0, 1) = vi(1, 0)− vi(0, 0) =
2[pbg + (1− p)bb]
3− p − c
So, for either region is a dominant strategy to invest if
c ≤ 2[pbg + (1− p)bb]
3− p = c
SBC
So, we have established the following characterization of the SBC equilibrium:
Proposition 2. If ∆ ≤ min{∆SBC , bg − c}, investment occurs, and high eﬀort is supplied
in both regions. If ∆ > ∆SBC and c ≤ cSBC investment occurs, and low eﬀort is supplied in
both regions. Otherwise, there is no investment in equilibrium in either region.
The equilibrium project choice, plus choice of eﬀort is depicted in the following figure.
c
bb
∆
2
bb
0=SBCSBC e,P
SBCNP
SBC∆
SBCc ∆=SBCSBC e,P
cbg −
Figure 3: Equilibrium project and eﬀort choice under SBC
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Comparing Propositions 1 and 2, and in particular, comparing critical values ∆∗,∆SBC
and c∗, cSBC , and noting that cSBC > c∗, ∆∗ > ∆SBC , we can establish the following
Proposition 3. If the SBC equilibrium is ineﬃcient, the ineﬃciency takes one of the follow-
ing two forms: either (i) investments are made in equilibrium when it is ineﬃcient to do so;
or (ii) investments are made in equilibrium and are eﬃcient, but low eﬀort is supplied when
it is eﬃcient to supply high eﬀort.
Thus with a SBC, ineﬃciency involves either oversupply of projects, or undersupply of
eﬀort. This Proposition is most easily proved with reference to Figure 4, which superimposes
Figure 3 on Figure 2.
c
bb
*∆
∆
2
bb
*c
SBC∆
A B
SBCc
cbg −
C
Figure 4: Ineﬃciencies under SBC
To draw this figure, we have assumed that 2pbg < (1 + p)bb.10 By construction of the Figure
4, in regions A and B, investments are made in equilibrium when it is ineﬃcient to do so11.
In region C, investments are made in equilibrium and are eﬃcient, but low eﬀort is supplied
when it is eﬃcient to supply high eﬀort.
4.2 A Hard Budget Constraint
Again, we solve the game backwards. In this case, there is no continuation if a project is
bad, so no tax is set at the end of t = 2, i.e. τ = 0. So, conditional on project realizations
10Again, this assumption is only made for graphical considerations. If 2pbg ≥ (1 + p)bb, the intersection
between bg − c and ∆SBC is in a point above bb. In that case, the unique diﬀerence with Figure 4 is that the
size of the parametric regions A, B and C change.
11This result is well known and is mainly driven by the externality eﬀect. The parametric area A represents
projects that should not have been undertaken by a social planner (because if so, they should have been
done with eﬀort which is socially too costly) but are nevertheless initiated by a regional government because
they will be undertaken with no eﬀort. The parametric area B represents projects that should not have been
undertaken by a social planner (because if so, they should have been done with no eﬀort and the cost of two
investments is socially too costly) but are nevertheless initiated by a regional government.
13
Ia, Ib, the utility of a resident of region i in equilibrium is
ui = (1− Ii)bg =
½
bg if ei = ∆
(1− Ii)bg if ei = 0
(12)
Again, let ui(ei, ej) be the expected present value of utility to a resident of region i from
choice of eﬀort levels ei, ej ∈ {0,∆}. From (12), we see immediately that:
ui(∆,∆) = ui(∆, 0) = bg, ui(0,∆) = ui(0, 0) = pbg (13)
From (13), it is easily calculated that
ui(∆,∆)− ui(0,∆) = ui(∆, 0)− ui(0, 0) = (1− p)bg
So, for either region, it is a dominant strategy to put in eﬀort in project implementation,
if ∆ ≤ (1− p)bg = ∆HBC and no eﬀort otherwise.
Now we turn to the investment decision. When ∆ ≤ ∆HBC , the government of region i
anticipates that both regions will exert eﬀort if investment has occurred. So
vi(1, 1) = vi(1, 0) = bg −∆, vi(0, 1) = vi(0, 0) = c
Therefore, for either region is a dominant strategy to invest if ∆ ≤ bg− c.When ∆ > ∆HBC ,
the government of region i anticipates that both regions will exert low eﬀort. So
vi(1, 1) = vi(1, 0) = pbg, vi(0, 1) = vi(0, 0) = c
Therefore, for either region it is a dominant strategy to invest if c ≤ pbg = cHBC . So, we
have established the following characterization of the HBC equilibrium:
Proposition 4. If ∆ ≤ min{∆HBC , bg − c}, investment occurs, and high eﬀort is supplied
in both regions. If ∆ > ∆HBC and c ≤ cHBC investment occurs, and low eﬀort is supplied
in both regions. Otherwise, there is no investment in equilibrium in either region.
The equilibrium project choice, plus choice of eﬀort is depicted in the following figure.
c
bb
∆
2
bb
*c
∆=HBCHBC e,P
HBCNP
HBC∆
HBCc
0=HBCHBC e,P
cbg −
Figure 5: Equilibrium project and eﬀort choice under HBC
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Comparing Propositions 1 and 4, and in particular, comparing critical values ∆∗,∆HBC and
c∗, cHBC , and noting that cHBC > c∗, ∆∗ < ∆HBC , we can establish the following.
Proposition 5. If the HBC equilibrium is ineﬃcient, the ineﬃciency takes one of the fol-
lowing two forms: either (i) investments are not made in equilibrium when it is eﬃcient to
do so; or (ii) investments are made in equilibrium when it is eﬃcient to do so, but high eﬀort
is supplied when it is eﬃcient to supply low eﬀort.
Thus ineﬃciency involves either undersupply of projects, or oversupply of eﬀort, the
reverse to the ineﬃciency arising with a SBC. This Proposition is most easily proved with
reference to Figure 6, which superimposes Figure 5 on Figure 2.
c
bb
∆
2
bb
*c
HBC∆
A B
HBCc
*∆
cbg −
C
Figure 6: Ineﬃciencies under HBC
For the sake of graphical clarity, we draw this figure assuming that cHBC > bb
2
. Again, this
assumption does not change qualitatively our results. In regions A and B of the parameter
space, investments are not made in equilibrium when it is eﬃcient to do so. In region C of
the parameter space, investments are made in equilibrium when it is eﬃcient to do so, but
high eﬀort is supplied when it is eﬃcient to supply low eﬀort.
4.3 Hard or Soft Budget Constraint?
In this subsection, we use all previous results to analyze the choice of the central government
in the first period. At t = 0, the CG decides whether to set a SBC or a HBC, comparing
the expected present value of the sums of regional welfares. The main result is as follows:
Proposition 6. At t = 0, the CG always chooses a regime that restores fully eﬃciency. But,
depending on parameters, both HBC or SBC can be optimal.
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The last result confirms a interesting trade-oﬀ between hard and soft budget constraints.
Under some parametric configurations, hard budget constraints help to overcome the exter-
nality eﬀect created by bailouts. But, under other parametric configurations, soft budget
constraints enable the central government to have some degree of flexibility, which creates
an option value to wait until the type of the project is revealed. This Proposition is most
easily understood using Figure 7.
c
bb
∆
2
bb
*c
HBC∆
HBCc
*∆SBC∆
SBCc
HBC HBC HBC
SBCSBChbc
sbc
cbg −
Figure 7: Comparisons of regimes
In the parametric areas without label, the central government is indiﬀerent between
imposing a hard or a soft budget constraint. This is not the case for the remaining areas,
where the central government strictly prefers one regime.
First, we explain the CG’s choice in the parametric areas characterized by capital letters.
On the one hand, in "HBC", the central government alleviates the externality eﬀect that
emerges under a soft budget constraint and that makes more projects to be ineﬃciently
financed. So, by choosing a hard budget constraint, the projects are eﬃciently not initiated.
On the other hand, in "SBC", the central government prefers a soft budget constraint because
this regime enables to continue bad projects for which this decision is socially eﬃcient. So
the projects are eﬃciently initiated.
Next we explain the CG’s choice in the parametric areas characterized by small letters.
In "hbc", the central government prefers a hard budget constraint. In spite of the fact that
under both regimes the projects are eﬃciently initiated, under a hard budget constraint both
regions exert eﬀort (the socially eﬃcient solution) and thus generate good projects. A similar
reasoning applies in "sbc", where the central government prefers a soft budget constraint
because under a hard budget constraint both regions exert eﬀort, which is socially ineﬃcient.
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Remark : This trade-oﬀ between HBC and SBC only emerges when moral hazard yields
to an uncertain outcome (i.e. p > 0). It is easy to verify that if p → 0, then c∗ → bb
2
,
cSBC → 2bb
3
> bb
2
and cHBC → 0. Therefore, under that circumstances (and recalling that we
have assumed that c > bb
2
) HBC always restores fully eﬃciency and thus dominates.
4.4 Performance-Based Taxes for Regional Government
So far, we have assumed that the project outcome is unverifiable, so that the CG cannot
directly reward or penalize RGs on the basis of project outcomes. If CG could do this, it
could achieve the eﬃcient outcome. Specifically, it could set a SBC combined with region-
specific taxes τ 1, τ 2 at the end of period 2, where τ i = c if the project in i turned out to be
bad . This penalty would have the dual role of repaying the loan for refinancing the project,
and incentivising RG to supply eﬃcient eﬀort. To put it another way, these taxes internalise
the fiscal externalities that arise with uniform taxation. But, in practice, we do not observe
such taxes. Indeed, tax rates set by central government are almost always uniform. One
reason may be that project outcomes may be unverifiable (as we have assumed). Another
may be that part of the role of the national tax system is to provide insurance. In any case,
our main objective in this paper is to study the eﬃciency of the HBC in an environment
where the SBC is ineﬃcient : otherwise, there is no real interest in the HBC.
5 Institutional Solutions
5.1 Centralization
One possible solution is for the central government to assume all the functions of regional
government i.e. project initiation and the supply of eﬀort. In our model, the central gov-
ernment (given that it is benevolent, by assumption) behaves like the social planner. So, it
would seem that centralization would solve the problem studied in this paper.
However, full centralization is not normally advocated as the solution to excessive sub-
national borrowing, because it may entail other ineﬃciencies. In particular, an argument
often made is that central government is less well-informed about regional preferences than
regional governments. This could be introduced (for example), in our framework, by sup-
posing at the initial investment stage, a fraction λ of potential projects are worthless (type
A projects), and a fraction 1−λ are as described above (type B projects), but only regional
governments know which are which. In this case, centralization would involve a new ineﬃ-
ciency. In that case, depending on the parameter values, it may be better to have divided
government than full centralization.
5.2 Decentralization
We define this form of government in the natural way as one where the regional government
assumes all the functions of government i.e. project initiation and supply of eﬀort, as well
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as the continuation decision, and tax powers at the end of the second period. The regional
government can now borrow, but must repay any borrowing out of an income tax levied
only on its own residents. If this tax is lump-sum, eﬃciency is clearly restored as there is
no fiscal externality, and thus no SBC. The decentralized government behaves just like the
social planner.
However, it is often argued that decentralization leads to other ineﬃciencies though fail-
ure to internalize inter-jurisdictional spillovers (Oates (1972)). A key example would be tax
externalities between regions, which generates ineﬃcient tax competition under decentral-
ization. More recently, it has been argued that the presence of tax competition, by raising
the perceived marginal cost of public funds at the regional level can endogenously "harden"
the government budget constraint (Qian and Roland (1998)).
We now show that this "hardening" of the budget constraint can indeed occur. However,
in our model, it has the opposite welfare consequence to that found in Qian and Roland
(1998). In that paper, hardening of the budget constraint though tax competition was
unambiguously good, as it prevented wasteful lending to state enterprises. Here, if the
hardening of the budget constraint has any eﬀect on the equilibrium, it will be to reduce
welfare, as it will cause ineﬃciently high eﬀort to be supplied, with too few projects initiated
as a consequence (from Proposition 4). Thus, decentralisation may be less eﬃcient than
divided government.
With fiscal decentralization, competition in income taxes can be introduced in a very
simple and natural way in our model by allowing workers to be mobile between regions, thus
generating a mobile tax base. This in turn raises the marginal cost of public funds when
only one project is bad, as then only one region needs to set a positive tax, and perceives
that in doing so, it will lose some of its tax base to the other region. This in turn makes
project continuation possibly undesirable from the point of view of the single region, thus
endogenously "hardening" the regional budget constraint.
The details are as follows. Any resident of region i can work either in region i itself, or
(at a mobility cost m) can work in region j. The mobility cost is uniformly distributed on
[0, 1]. In each case, the resident of i can earn a wage (normalized to unity) in either region,
minus any tax paid. Let τa, τ b ∈ [0, 1] be the income tax rates. Moreover, for simplicity12,
we will assume that residents of i who work in region j still enjoy the benefits of consumption
of private and public goods in region i, and their welfare is thus taken into account by the
regional government of i.
Then, the payoﬀ of a resident of region i in period 2, assuming that a bad project is
refinanced, is
ui(m) = bb +
½
1− τ i if m ≥ τ i − τ j
1− τ j −m if m < τ i − τ j
(14)
12Without this assumption, we introduce a "tax exporting" incentive for regional governments which will
tend to lower the marginal cost of public funds, implying that in this case, decentralization cannot harden
the budget constraint.
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Assume w.l.o.g. that τ i > τ j. So, from (14), the sum of utilities of all residents in region i isZ 1
0
ui(m)dm = bb + [1− (τ i − τ j)](1− τ i) +
Z τ i−τj
0
(1− τ j −m)dm (15)
= bb + [1− (τ i − τ j)](1− τ i) + (τ i − τ j)(1− τ j −
(τ i − τ j)
2
)
where 1−(τ i−τ j) is the fraction of the population who do not move, (τ i−τ j) is the fraction
who do, and 1−τ i, 1−τ j−m are their respective wages net of taxes and any mobility costs.
The regional government budget constraint is therefore
ri = τ i[1− (τ i − τ j)] (16)
where ri is any repayment to the banking sector. Note that ri = 0 if the project is good,
and ri = c with probability 1− p if the project is bad and is refinanced.
Now consider the refinancing decision. These decisions can now be interdependent as the
tax that region i must set to cover the cost of refinancing depends on the tax that region j
sets. For simplicity, assume that each region can observe not only whether its own project
is good or bad, but also whether the project in the other region is good or bad.
There are then two cases. The first is where region i has a bad project, but region j has
a good project. In that case, it is always optimal for j to set τ j = 0. Then, i anticipates that
j will set τ j = 0, and thus the tax needed for refinancing is, from (16), τ i = τ > c, where τ
is the smaller root13 of c = τ(1− τ). Then, from (15), welfare in region i is
bb + (1− τ)2 + τ(1−
τ
2
) = bb + 1− τ(1− τ)−
τ 2
2
= bb + 1− (c+
τ 2
2
)
This is to be compared to welfare of 1 without refinancing. So, the gain to refinancing the
project is bb−(c+ τ
2
2
), implying that the eﬀective cost of refinancing is now (c+ τ2
2
) > c. Thus,
τ 2/2 is the deadweight loss of financing continuation of the project though a distortionary
tax. More precisely, τ 2/2 measures the mobility costs incurred by workers seeking to avoid
the higher tax in region i.
The second case is where both regions have bad projects. In this case, both have the
option of refinancing (say R) or terminating the project (say T ). Then, it is easily seen that
the two regions play the following 2×2 matrix game, where region i chooses rows, and j
chooses columns and the payoﬀs are regional utilities, ignoring the constant of 1 :
i\j R T
R bb − c, bb − c bb − (c+ τ
2
2
), 0
T 0, bb − (c+ τ
2
2
) 0, 0
(17)
13In fact, τ = 1−
√
1−4c
2 , so it must be the case that c ≤
1
4 . This reinforces the condition c < 1 that must
hold, in order to be viable the bad project’s refinancing. If c > 14 , refinancing is impossible if only one region
has a bad project. But the analysis of this case is similar to the one we perform below and thus omitted
from the model.
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The explanation of the payoﬀs is as follows. If both refinance i.e. (R,R), both will set the
same tax i.e. some tax τ i = τ j = τ , so from (15), regional welfare is bb + 1 − τ , and from
(16), τ = c. If only one region choose to refinance, it must set a tax τ as before, which gives
a payoﬀ of bb − (c+ τ
2
2
).
As bb > c, τ > 0, if bb ≥ (c+ τ
2
2
) the only weakly undominated Nash equilibrium of this
game is for both regions to continue financing. On the other hand, if bb < (c + τ
2
2
), (R,R)
and (T, T ) are both Nash equilibria. Note that (R,R) Pareto-dominates (T, T ), so if players
could coordinate, they would play (R,R). However, there is no consensus in the game-theory
literature that such coordination is possible, so we will consider both outcomes.
First, if bb ≥ (c+ τ
2
2
), bad projects are always refinanced, so it is clear that the outcome
is eﬃcient and thus as described as in Proposition 1. Now consider the case where when14
bb < (c + τ
2
2
). Suppose first that the "bad" equilibrium (T, T ) prevails when both regions
have bad projects. In this case, there is an endogenous HBC15 with probability 1; that
is, if a region has a bad project, it will always terminate it in equilibrium, whether the
other region has a bad project or not. Thus, the outcome is exactly as in the case with
an exogenously imposed hard budget constraint i.e. as described in Proposition 4. Thus,
by Proposition 5, decentralisation can be ineﬃcient, and moreover, by the discussion in
Section 4.3, decentralisation can be less eﬃcient than divided government with a soft budget
constraint.
Now suppose that the "good" equilibrium (R,R) prevails when both regions have bad
projects. Then, there is an endogenous HBC in the event that one region has a bad project
and the other a good project. In this case, existing propositions do not apply, and some more
analysis is needed to characterise the equilibrium. First, if both regions exert low eﬀort, this
now gives an expected continuation payoﬀ of
ui(0, 0) = pbg + (1− p)p0 + (1− p)2(bb − c)
This is because with probability (1− p)p, only one region has a bad project, in which case
cost of continuation is τ , and thus it terminates this project; on the other hand, if both
regions have bad projects, there is no termination, as the "good" equilibrium (R,R) entails
that projects are refinanced. On the other hand, ui(0,∆) = pbg because in this case, the
cost of continuation is τ with probability 1. Finally, ui(∆,∆) = ui(∆, 0) = bg because if the
project is good, region i does not need to levy a tax and thus has no interaction with the
other region.
From these expressions, it is easily calculated that
ui(∆,∆)− ui(0,∆) = (1− p)bg = ∆HBC
ui(∆, 0)− ui(0, 0) = (1− p)bg − (1− p)2(bb − c) = ∆ˆ
14As c ≤ 14 , c+
τ2
2 = c+
1
2
³
1−
√
1−4c
2
´2
≤ 38 . So this case can happen provided bb <
3
8 .
15We say that the HBC is endogenous here because it is not due to explicit precommitment not to borrow,
but because borrowing is too expensive in equilibrium, because of the deadweight loss of repayment due to
tax competition.
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Note that ∆ˆ < ∆HBC . So, if ∆ < ∆ˆ, there is a unique equilibrium where both regions set
e = ∆, and if ∆ > ∆HBC , there is a unique equilibrium where both regions set e = 0. If
∆ˆ ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆HBC , there are two symmetric equilibria (∆,∆) and (0, 0).
Now, turn to the initial investment decision. If ∆ ≤ ∆ˆ, the government of region i
anticipates that both regions will exert eﬀort if investment has occurred. So
vi(1, 1) = vi(1, 0) = bg −∆, vi(0, 1) = vi(0, 0) = c
Therefore, for either region is a dominant strategy to invest if ∆ ≤ bg− c.When ∆ > ∆HBC ,
the government of region i anticipates that both regions will exert low eﬀort. So,
vi(1, 1) = vi(1, 0) = pbg + (1− p)p0 + (1− p)2(bb − c)
vi(0, 1) = vi(0, 0) = c
Therefore, for either region it is a dominant strategy to invest if c ≤ pbg+(1−p)
2bb
1+(1−p)2 = cˆ.
Finally, suppose that ∆ˆ ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆HBC . Suppose first that regions anticipate supplying
high eﬀort. Then, by the argument just given, each will invest if ∆ ≤ bg − c. On the other
hand, if regions anticipate supplying low eﬀort, each is again willing to invest if c ≤ cˆ. So, we
have established the following characterization of the equilibrium with an endogenous HBC
under decentralization when the good equilibrium (R,R) prevails in (17)
Proposition 7. If ∆ ≤ min {∆ˆ, bg − c}, investment occurs and high eﬀort is supplied in
both regions. If ∆ ≥ ∆HBC and c ≤ cˆ, investment occurs and low eﬀort is supplied in
both regions. If ∆ ∈ (∆ˆ,∆HBC) and c ≤ cˆ, multiple equilibria are possible. On the one
hand, there is an equilibrium where investment occurs, and low eﬀort is supplied in both
regions. On the other hand, there is an equilibrium where investment occurs and high eﬀort
is supplied in both regions, provided ∆ ≤ bg − c. Otherwise, no investments are made in
equilibrium.
Clearly, multiple equilibria are possible here. Nevertheless, comparing with Proposition
1, the ineﬃciency of the outcome under decentralization is clear, as ∆ˆ > ∆∗: if the outcome
is ineﬃcient, it will involve either (i) too high eﬀort, or (ii) project not initiated when it is
eﬃcient to do so.
6 Related Literature and Conclusions
6.1 Related Literature
Related literature is as follows. First, the concept of the SBC was introduced by Kornai
(1980, 1986) and mainly applied to state-owned enterprises in socialist economies. The sub-
sequent literature tried to analyze, in diﬀerent contexts, the reasons for the emergence of
such a problem: paternalism, political intervention, asymmetric information and lack of com-
mitment, corrupt influences, etc. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) were the first to provide
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an explanation for the SBC based on asymmetric information and lack of commitment (i.e.
without reference to any exogenous factors).
This basic model has been extended in a number of directions, and the current literature
is surveyed by Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2004). However, the focus of the literature
is on various mechanisms that can help harden the budget constraint: there is no model
currently in the literature (to our knowledge) that explicitly makes the point that HBCs
may be suboptimal. An example of the literature on "hardening" the budget constraint that
is most closely related to what we do here is Qian and Roland (1998). Their contribution
is to show that decentralization of tax powers raises the marginal cost of public funds to
sub-central government, and thus makes it more costly for these governments to bail out
enterprises16. This eﬀect is reinforced by monetary centralization.
Other work (e.g. Wildasin (1997) and Goodspeed (2002)) take a more traditional public
finance approach to the problem of SBC for RGs. They do not explicitly model the agency
problem between RG and central government (i.e. in terms of asymmetric information), but
generate a soft budget constraint by assuming a particular timing in the model: i.e. that
central government chooses grants to the regions after having observed regional decisions on
the provision of regional public goods. The models diﬀer substantially in detail: in Wildasin
(1997), the SBC is due to the fact that CG has an ex post incentive to increase expenditure on
local public goods because they generate spillovers that are ignored by RGs. In Goodspeed
(1998), CG may increase the second-period grant to a particular RG when it increases its
borrowing. In both models, however, if the CG could commit to a HBC, eﬃciency could be
restored. In Inman (2003), a model of interaction between CG and a RG is presented that
explicitly includes a dynamic commitment problem as in Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2004).
However, it is a very stylized model, and again, the imposition of a HBC restores eﬃciency.
Last, our paper is also related to Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2004). In their article,
regions derive utility from the consumption of a private good and a national public good.
Each region is endowed with an exogenous random level of output. The federal government
has an exogenous level of resources to finance the national public good and to set transfers
to the regions, without knowing the realization of their level of output. Two regimes are
considered. In the first, the federal government commits ex ante to a transfer to each region.
In the second, the regional governments simultaneously choose transfers subject to the federal
government budget constraint i.e. the federal government fully accommodates to the requests
for transfers that each region makes. Sanguinetti and Tommasi find the conditions for which
either one of the regimes dominate. The second regime has the advantage of oﬀering full
insurance, but at the cost of a common pool problem where the national public good is
underprovided. The first regime has no common pool problem, but oﬀers no insurance. It
can be thought of as a kind of HBC regime, but it is not a HBC in the usual sense of
the term i.e. a precommitment ex ante not to provide resources, as there is no dynamic
16This formal result has been adopted by the (political science) supporters of the idea that “federalism
preserves markets”. See Weingast (1995), Montinola, Qian and Weingast (1995) and Qian and Weingast
(1997). Although Rodden and Rose-Ackerman (1997) also argue against the predictions of Montinola, Qian
and Weingast (1995), they do not criticize neither the logic nor the results of this model per se (as we do)
but rather the fact that the assumptions are unrealistic.
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precommitment problem in their paper.
6.2 Conclusions
This paper has shown that, in the context of a model of fiscal federalism where central
government has a dynamic commitment problem, a HBC does not necessarily "solve" this
problem. Our argument was the following. First, by definition, a HBC necessarily implies
that "bad" investment projects will be terminated, when ex post, it would be desirable
to continue them though additional financing. Now suppose that by exerting some eﬀort,
RGs can lower the probability that projects are "bad". Then, with a HBC, RGs are over-
incentivised to provide eﬀort, as payoﬀ to them in the event of a bad project is excessively
low. Thus, eﬀort exerted may be ineﬃcient. More importantly, when this is the case, some
projects will not be initiated in the first place, even when it is eﬃcient to do so. So, a HBC
may lead to underinvestment. The argument developed in this paper is quite general, and
may apply to areas other than fiscal federalism. That is a topic for future research.
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